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ABSTRACT. In this paper I present a model of economic
growth that combines insights from endogenous growth theory,
the ﬁeld of entrepreneurship research and the philosophy and
economics of science. The model is built on three relatively
standard assumptions and a Kuhnian approach to scientiﬁc
knowledge accumulation. I assume that innovation generates
economic growth, that opportunity driven entrepreneurship is
an important source of innovation, that entrepreneurial
opportunities increasingly arise out of scientiﬁc knowledge
creation and that science follows Kuhnian paradigm shifting
dynamics. The model then generates opportunity driven cycles
in entrepreneurial activity that in turn cause waves of innova-
tion and cycles in economic growth. This result is highly rele-
vant and ﬁlls a gap in all three literatures as ‘traditional
endogenous growth models typically generate constant growth
rates in the steady state, entrepreneurship research keeps the
origin of entrepreneurial opportunity exogenous and the liter-
atures on the philosophy and economics of science ignore the
important downstream economic implications of the non-proﬁt
driven institutional framework that governs scientiﬁc knowl-
edge accumulation. This paper contributes by identifying sci-
entiﬁc institutions and entrepreneurial activity as prerequisites
for economic growth and it oﬀers a tentative explanation for
the rise and fall in the levels of scientiﬁc, entrepreneurial and
economic activity over the Kondratieﬀ-cycle.
KEYWORDS: endogenous growth theory, entrepreneur-
ship, paradigms, scientiﬁc institutions.
JEL-CLASSIFICATIONS: E32, L26, M13, O11, O31,
O41.
1. Introduction
Politicians and academics readily acknowledge
the importance of both science and a healthy
and vibrant entrepreneurial sector for gener-
ating economic growth. The former is seen as
the source of new knowledge whereas the lat-
ter is the channel through which that knowl-
edge enters the economy. The European
Commissions recent Green Paper on Entre-
preneurship (EU, 2003) and accompanying
Action Plan (EU, 2004) illustrate that view.
The famous Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the US
also exempliﬁes the importance politicians at-
tach to the science and entrepreneurship
nexus.
The link between scientiﬁc discovery and
economic growth on the one hand has a long
history in the economic literature.1 Theoretical
work and empirical evidence, linking entrepre-
neurship to innovation and growth on the other
hand is also accumulating rapidly (e.g. Cantil-
lion, 1755; Schumpeter, 1934 and recently Acs
et al., 2004, 2006; Karlsson, et al., 2004; Au-
dretsch and Thurik, 2002). Making the connec-
tion between economic performance and science
through entrepreneurial activity, however, is not
that self-evident in the literature. In fact the
relevance of entrepreneurs for economic growth
and of science as a source for entrepreneurial
opportunities has only recently been rediscov-
ered.2 In the academic literature entrepreneur-
ship, science and economic growth are still
largely studied in isolation.
Entrepreneurship research, the philosophy
and economics of science and modern growth
theory, however, have quite a lot to learn from
each other. In this paper I will present a model
that connects these literatures by taking some






Max Planck Institute of Economics
Kahlaische Strasse 10, 07745, Jena, Germany
E-mail: m.sanders@econ.uu.nl
Small Business Economics (2007) 28:339–354  Springer 2007
DOI 10.1007/s11187-006-9038-6
key insights away from each. I assume (with
modern growth theory) that innovation, the
commercialization of new knowledge, creates
growth. Then (with entrepreneurship research) I
assume that entrepreneurs commercialize the
opportunities that new knowledge creation pre-
sents, taking away the rents and proﬁts as their
reward. And ﬁnally (with the philosophy and
economics of science) that knowledge creation
follows a reputation driven, cyclical paradigm
shifting dynamic as described ﬁrst by Kuhn
(1971). By taking a Kuhnian approach to sci-
entiﬁc knowledge creation and linking scientiﬁc
knowledge creation to entrepreneurial opportu-
nity recognition and innovation, the model en-
dogenizes the aggregate level of entrepreneurial
activity and generates opportunity driven cycles
in entrepreneurial activity and economic
growth. In doing so it contributes to endoge-
nous growth theory by connecting it to the
wealth of insights from entrepreneurship re-
search, to the ﬁeld of entrepreneurship by
uncovering one important source of opportunity
and to the literature on the evolution of science
by making its relevance for the process of eco-
nomic growth explicit. The main contribution of
bringing these literatures together is the fact that
the total will turn out to be larger than the sum
of its parts.
I ﬁrst present a short survey of the relevant
literatures, then spend some time on introducing
and justifying my Kuhnian approach to science.
Then I present and analyze the model, which
borrows heavily from endogenous growth the-
ory and introduces both entrepreneurs and sci-
entists.
2. Entrepreneurship and the theory of economic
growth
The ﬁeld of Entrepreneurship research was de-
ﬁned by Shane and Venkataraman (2000) to
study: ‘‘how, by whom and with what conse-
quences opportunities to produce future goods and
services are discovered, evaluated and exploi-
ted’’.3 This deﬁnition explicitly focuses on the
chain of events that follows the initial emergence
of an opportunity and ignores how such
opportunities come to exist. Entrepreneurship
research thus takes the emergence of such
commercial opportunities largely as given.4 Still
the nature of the opportunity under investiga-
tion is so fundamental that the literature on
entrepreneurship has frequently been classiﬁed
(e.g Wennekers and Thurik, 1999; Karlsson
et al., 2004; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005),
according to the type of opportunity under
investigation. The opportunities considered
range from Kirznerian (1973) arbitrage oppor-
tunities that involve no innovation and move the
economy towards the production possibilities
frontier to the Schumpetarian (1934) commer-
cial introduction of radically new inventions,
that move that frontier out.5 This broad scope
has allowed entrepreneurship research to span a
wide variety of issues, that in addition has been
addressed from many disciplines ranging from
innovation management to cognitive psychol-
ogy.
Most of that literature aims at identifying the
(idiosyncratic) factors that explain the willing-
ness and ability of (individual) entrepreneurs to
recognize and successfully exploit the opportu-
nities that come along. Such factors go a long
way in explaining the individual, regional and
international diﬀerences in entrepreneurial
activity. It is beyond the scope and purpose of
this paper to give a complete overview of what
may motivate and enable or prevent an entre-
preneur to act on an opportunity.6 At this point
I observe from this literature that the creation of
new ideas and more precisely, commercial
opportunities is usually treated as an exogenous
supply push factor in the decision to become an
entrepreneur and consequently in determining
the aggregate level of entrepreneurial activity.
Probably for that reason modern growth lit-
erature largely abstracts from the entrepreneur
and has generally ignored entrepreneurship
research. Despite models that explicitly
acknowledge their Schumpeterian roots (Aghion
and Howitt, 1992; Segerstrom et al., 1990), the
entrepreneurial function usually coincides with
that of the knowledge creator. The implicit jus-
tiﬁcation is that separating them has little to
oﬀer when the focus is at the macro-level. At the
aggregate level idiosyncratic factors average out
and as an average entrepreneur recognizes an
average number of opportunities and given his
average propensity, ability and talent to pursue
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that opportunity, such a separate agent merely
creates a ﬂow of successful innovations that is
largely determined by the arrival rate of
opportunities.
Therefore entrepreneurship research cannot
help to explain the Solow (1957)-residual that
motivated growth theory for the past half a
century. Growth theory rather turns directly to
the origin of the knowledge that underlies
commercial opportunities. Arrow (1962) for
example linked knowledge accumulation and
opportunity creation as a positive externality to
the production process through learning-by-do-
ing. With the contributions of Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992) knowledge was privatized, the
externality partially internalized and the crea-
tion of commercial opportunities was modeled
as the purpose of an economic activity in itself.7
In general these models and the avalanche of
papers that followed (see for good surveys,
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 2004; Jones, 2006), implicitly assume
that commercialization is trivial and treat the
decision to create and exploit knowledge as a
single rational decision that involves weighing
expected future proﬁts against current costs of
creating knowledge in terms of some dedicated
R&D inputs. But that shortcut is only justiﬁed
when collapsing these decisions into one does
not change the results in a qualitative way. The
model below will show that it does.
If commercialization is not assumed to be
trivial and the entrepreneur captures the rents of
commercialization, these rents are a reward for
bearing the risk and making the eﬀort to turn an
opportunity into a product and organizing
production. But if the entrepreneur does not
engage in opportunity creation, then these rents
cannot provide the incentive for knowledge
creation as they do in endogenous growth
models. Who then generates the knowledge and
for what reason? To address that question let us
take a step back and consider knowledge itself.
3. The origins of knowledge
Broadly speaking knowledge is generated in two
ways. Research in laboratories and universities
might be the ﬁrst way that springs to the modern
mind but in fact learning by doing (Arrow,
1962) has been the dominant source of knowl-
edge accumulation over most of human history
and remains incredibly important even today.
One can thus actively pursue knowledge or come
across it. Arguably these activities can also
generate two types of knowledge. These I will
classify broadly as fundamental and instrumen-
tal knowledge respectively.8 Consider for
example ﬁre. The instrumental knowledge of ﬁre
allowed cavemen to use it to warm themselves
and cook their food. Also they learned by doing
that ﬁre needed to be fed with combustibles and
that blowing into the ﬂames increased the gen-
erated heat. Over the centuries that instrumental
knowledge has expanded and many commercial
opportunities and new technologies emerged.
Bread, metallurgy and blast furnaces are but a
few examples that were developed mainly on the
instrumental knowledge of ﬁre alone.
The fundamental knowledge of ﬁre, despite
eﬀorts by for example the Greek philosophers in
Antiquity and a few scattered scholars in the
Middle-Ages, hardly developed before the 19th
century. The diﬀerence is between knowing and
understanding ﬁre, between knowing what
works and why it works. Learning by doing is
obviously very eﬀective in generating instru-
mental knowledge and only generates funda-
mental understanding by accident. Pure science
on the other hand is entirely focused on gener-
ating fundamental knowledge, but has no clear
direct application in mind.9
Therefore fundamental knowledge in general
is a richer source of opportunity as it is under-
stood in this paper. Scientists put very little ef-
fort in ﬁnding commercial applications (over
and beyond the development of scientiﬁc
instruments) and science may thus be said to
produce new commercial opportunities as an
unintended side-product.10
Modern endogenous growth models focus on
the non-rivalry of knowledge and the economics
of scale that therefore exist at the aggregate le-
vel. As instrumental knowledge is often tacit
whereas scientiﬁc knowledge is always published
(see below) one would expect that the knowledge
they refer to is fundamental. But the process
they model resembles gradual and accumulative
learning more than it captures the process of
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fundamental knowledge evolution itself. This is
increasingly important as science and funda-
mental knowledge are quickly replacing learning
by doing and instrumental knowledge as the
main source of opportunity for commercial
innovation. If anything this trend has gained
momentum over the 20th century.11
The increasing importance of science for
growth is not only derived from the direct cre-
ation of unexploited opportunities. A lot of the
evidence on patent citations (e.g. Grilliches,
1979, 1984, 1992; Jaﬀe, 1986; Jaﬀe and
Trajtenberg, 2002) shows that commercial
opportunities are often clever re-combinations
of existing and new knowledge. Arrowian
learning-by-doing and Romerian commercial
R&D are particularly likely to generate such re-
combinations, accidentally and intentionally,
respectively.12 So to the extent that learning-by-
doing and commercial R&D generate the com-
mercial opportunities that the entrepreneurs can
act upon, their models capture much of what we
measure as economic growth.13
However, as Olsson (2000, 2005) shows, re-
combinatory knowledge expansion faces strong
diminishing returns without the occasional
introduction of genuinely new knowledge. Such
genuinely new knowledge cannot be considered
‘‘manna from heaven’’ or a mere side product of
normal commercial activity, lest we return to the
Solowian world, where ultimately growth is
exogenous. Commercially driven R&D as in
Romer is also unlikely to generate a lot of that
genuinely new knowledge as the returns are
highly uncertain and very hard to appropriate.
So more important than the direct commercial
opportunities that are left unexploited by sci-
entists, the fundamental knowledge they create
has the potential to open up new areas and
paths for instrumental knowledge creation to
proceed without running into diminishing
returns.
The vast literature on technological paradigms
(Nelson and Winter, 1977; Dosi, 1982) and
General Purpose Technologies (Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1995) presents a more historical
perspective on economic development that stres-
ses the importance of these occasional knowledge
breakthroughs that set oﬀ a new period of high
entrepreneurial activity and consequently a wave
of incremental, re-combinatory product and
process innovations. To capture such dynamics in
a growth model I introduce a separate sector
dedicated to producing new fundamental
knowledge: basic science.14
4. Science and scientists
The critical consideration to be made in this
light is that scientists are a diﬀerent breed of
economic agents altogether. Quite a large lit-
erature in the philosophy and economics of
science has evolved on that topic, although to
my knowledge it has not been brought to bare
on the issues of economic growth or entre-
preneurship.15 As fundamental knowledge cre-
ation takes place in what we may label the
scientiﬁc community, the incentives and con-
straints as well as its institutions require fur-
ther discussion before the endogenous
emergence and subsequent commercialization
of opportunity itself can be modeled. By now
it is clear that traditional and modern growth
theory only oﬀers a few useful starting points
in this respect. To dig deeper we need to
consider perhaps less orthodox strands of lit-
erature that are relevant here.
In this section I will discuss insights from
Thomas Kuhn and link his seminal essay on
scientiﬁc evolution to the literature on the eco-
nomics of science that explicitly addresses the
incentives and constraints that motivate scien-
tists.16 We will see that these diﬀer quite signif-
icantly from those in commercial R&D. As a
consequence fundamental knowledge evolution
follows a very diﬀerent pattern than the smooth
steady state that commercial innovation driven
new growth models predict.
The motivation for choosing Kuhns ‘model
is threefold. Although published in the early
70s this monograph still in many ways repre-
sents the state of the art in thinking about
science and scientiﬁc activity. More elaborate,
more complicated and more detailed theories
of scientiﬁc knowledge creation have been
published since but none have overturned any
of Kuhns key results or challenged his detailed
account of the institutional setting that pro-
duces them.17 Also, Kuhn is part of most
academic training and therefore requires
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refreshing rather than fully developing his
narrative, saving me and the reader a lot of
time. Finally, and that is not a small advan-
tage over alternative more modern theories of
science, Kuhns theory has been shown to be
internally and dynamically consistent and log-
ically sound by Sterman (1982) and Sterman
and Wittenberg (1999), who reproduced
Kuhns key predictions in a simulation model.
As Kuhns model is suﬃciently rich but not
too complex, is almost common knowledge
and has been shown to be suitable for my
purpose, I will restrict myself to his theory.
Kuhn ﬁrst argues that scientiﬁc knowledge,
a constellation of facts, theories and methods,
evolves historically and not, as textbooks
would suggest, accumulate in a linear fashion
from ignorance to full knowledge of the truth.
A scientiﬁc discipline is born with the emer-
gence of its ﬁrst paradigm; a scientiﬁc
achievement or insight that for a period of
time is broadly shared among those engaged in
scientiﬁc research. Once a paradigm has
emerged the discipline will never be without
one, although it typically does not remain the
same over time. It is the existence of a para-
digm that makes a discipline ‘‘scientiﬁc’’.
The function of a paradigm is not to embody
absolute truth or even necessarily bring the
discipline closer to the truth but merely to guide
further scientiﬁc activity. Scientists, however,
have to believe in the truth of the paradigm to be
able to engage in what Kuhn calls ‘‘normal sci-
ence’’. That belief allows scientists to skip dis-
cussing the fundamentals and get right down to
details.
Kuhn then likens normal science to puzzle
solving. Like any normal puzzle there are rules
and an expected and assured outcome under
the prevailing paradigm. To solve a puzzle is
testimony to the scientists ingenuity and is
rewarded by peer recognition and status under
normal science. To fail at a puzzle is not
attributed to the puzzle or the rules but to the
scientist. If he steps beyond the bounds of the
paradigm for a solution his peers will not re-
ward but ignore him, however right he may
prove to have been in the future. The reward
for a scientist thus follows not from ﬁnding
truth in any objective sense of the word.
Normal science generates fundamental
knowledge. To quote Kuhn (1971): ‘‘Normal
science, the puzzle solving activity we have just
examined, is a highly cumulative enterprise, emi-
nently successful in its aim, the steady extension
of the scope and precision of scientiﬁc knowledge’’
p. 52. But even as the paradigm allows for
normal science to emerge, it thereby plants the
seeds for its own demise. Under normal science,
scientists seek and ﬁnd facts to generalize,
articulate and reﬁne the core theories of the
paradigm. In doing so, they encounter two types
of results. Of course they ﬁnd anticipated results
that strengthen the incumbent paradigm and
which do not call for theoretical revisions and
reﬁnements. The unanticipated ones are initially
regarded as failures of the scientist or his
instruments, not of the paradigm. But if persis-
tent they require further scrutiny and possibly
reﬁnement of the core theories and if the unan-
ticipated result resists this absorption it becomes
an anomaly.
Initially such anomalies can be ignored by the
mainstream but as they accumulate the para-
digm faces a crisis. When confronted with a
crisis, the rules of the incumbent paradigm are
stretched, speculative new theories are formu-
lated and discarded and the paradigm is pushed
to its limits to exactly pinpoint where it fails.
During the crisis more than one alternative
paradigm may emerge and compete for domi-
nance for a while. In those episodes a lot of
energy is ‘‘wasted’’ on debating fundamentals
and justifying ones choice of paradigm. Normal
progress stalls. Kuhn stresses that such a conﬂict
of paradigms cannot be resolved by anything
other than the power of persuasion and the crisis
ends only when most scientists are persuaded to
adopt a new paradigm. Those who refuse to
follow the mainstream are not necessarily wrong
but will henceforth be ignored and regarded as
either old fashioned, irrelevant and wrong.
Obviously there is a lot of resistance to par-
adigm change as vested interests, reputations
and research programs have been built on the
incumbent one. This, and the sudden resolution
of paradigm conﬂicts, explains the revolutionary
and pervasive eﬀect of an occasional paradigm
shift when it does occur. A revolution, although
upsetting, ultimately means progress. Scientists
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cannot be convinced to abandon the incumbent
paradigm if the new one does not at least
promise to explain a considerable part of what
was known under the old paradigm and some
anomalies in addition. In that sense the new
paradigm must be judged ‘‘better’’ before it will
be adopted by the entire scientiﬁc community
and progress is ensured.
The ﬁrst task set to the scientists who adopt a
new paradigm is to reformulate all data, theory
and knowledge previously accumulated into the
structure of the new paradigm. Measurements
are aimed at verifying the new paradigm and
well known phenomena must be recast in the
light of new theories. A lot of this has been done
in the persuasion battle for scientists allegiance,
but still much remains to be done. This activity
is necessary to establish a new paradigm but is
very unproductive in terms of generating new
commercial opportunities. Arguably Newtons
fundamentally new understanding of the pen-
dulum-motion caused a revolution in physics
but not in clock making. In this stage it is the
absorption of old anomalies that does allow for
increases in commercial opportunities. But as
normal science is re-established the rate of
opportunity creation quickly picks up.
Kuhn thus describes how and why funda-
mental scientiﬁc knowledge starts to progress at
a signiﬁcant rate but in a cyclical fashion after
the establishment of its ﬁrst paradigm. So far the
theory was largely descriptive. But when we
shortly consider the institutional setting in
which scientists ﬁnd themselves, the behavior
that generates the above dynamics in funda-
mental knowledge creation can be explained,
also in economic terms.
Kuhn stresses the importance of a relatively
closed and intensively communicating scientiﬁc
community that has the resources to ﬁnance its
activities and can decide on how to allocate
those resources relatively autonomously. This
implies that the scientists decide among them-
selves what is and what is not science, what will
and will not be ﬁnanced and who is and who is
not recognized as a fellow scientist. This makes
reputation and peer recognition, not commercial
application and expected rents, the key motiva-
tions for scientiﬁc activity. A reputation is built
by establishing priority over discoveries.
Stephan (1996) refers to Merton (1957, 1968,
1969) who argued that scientists aim to establish
priority of discovery by being the ﬁrst to publish
their ﬁndings in a recognized publication. Sci-
entist do not seek to appropriate the rents of
their knowledge, but actually get rewarded by
giving up such exclusive ownership. Scientists
are thus in the business of creating and pub-
lishing fundamental knowledge, not commer-
cializing possible applications.
But because reputation does not pay the bills,
the scientist will only seek peer recognition as
long as the institutional setting ensures that in-
come and prestige follow from it.18 Dasgupta
and Davids (1994) ‘‘new’’ economics of science
considers these institutions to be endogenous
and in this ﬁeld game theory, principal-agent
and incomplete contract theory have been used
to establish that such endogenous institutions
indeed translate reputation into wages, job
opportunities, tenure and fringe beneﬁts.19 The
institutional structure may diﬀer in the details
between countries and institutions but its key
attributes characterize a more or less global
scientiﬁc community.
The institutional structure thus supports a
self-governing community of scientists that
generates a ﬂow of fundamental knowledge in
the pursuit of reputation. The question then
arises how the scientiﬁc community can switch
paradigms when all individual scientists have no
incentive to do so as their reputations are built
on the incumbent paradigm. One could think of
this process as a rational speculative attack as
for example modeled in Krugman (1979). In
that model the gradual erosion of monetary re-
serves causes a sudden speculative attack prior
to the actual depletion of reserves. The funda-
mental force that weakens an incumbent para-
digm when all scientists are engaged in normal
science was described above. As anomalies
accumulate a crisis becomes ever more likely,
making it less and less attractive to invest
heavily in the incumbent paradigm and more
attractive to engage in looking for a new para-
digm. The rewards to the latter in terms of
reputation and satisfaction increase and become
less insecure whereas the puzzles of the incum-
bent paradigm become harder to solve and less
likely to yield rewards in the future.
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Institutions that are built upon reputation
therefore also explain the fact that young sci-
entists, who have no reputation, are the ﬁrst to
switch and usually become the leading scientists
in the next paradigm. To be among those lead-
ing scientists means to enjoy a high status in-
deed, as the rewards in science are distributed
extremely unequally. The winners take most; the
rewards for second place are marginal. About
6% of all publishing scientists produce 50% of
all publications and consequently lead the cita-
tions indices and collect all prizes.20 What re-
mains for the remaining 94% of publishing
scientists is the gratiﬁcation of solving an occa-
sional puzzle and usually spending a lot of time
trying to keep up and, although certainly not
unimportant, training the next generation of
scientists.
One ﬁnal issue now remains to be ad-
dressed.21 If all scientiﬁc activity takes place in
such institutional settings and paradigms occa-
sionally shift, does that imply that the aggregate
rate of fundamental knowledge creation follows
cyclical dynamics? Paradigm shifts are some-
times pervasive and ripple throughout science
and sometimes they are very much limited to a
very speciﬁc ﬁeld or discipline. Likewise the
commercial opportunities that arise may some-
times be concentrated in a very narrowly deﬁned
industry and sometimes constitute a GPT. As
these waves emerge to some extent indepen-
dently and arrive randomly, they may cancel
each other out across disciplines and generate at
the aggregate level a smooth inﬂow of oppor-
tunities across industries.
By the same token, however, the waves may
also strengthen each other, converge and cause a
tsunami. In the model below I consider science
to be one-dimensional and do not consider
multiple disciplines or industries of application.
This implies that all paradigm shifts cause waves
that aﬀect the opportunities for entrepreneurs
and consequently reach the rate of innovation
undiluted. One should therefore consider the
model to be a description of the dynamics in a
single innovation column where the interaction
between one industry of application and one
scientiﬁc discipline is analyzed or alternatively,
consider it to describe General Purpose Tech-
nology (ICT, genetics) enabling paradigm shifts
(solid-state physics, bio-chemistry and molecu-
lar biology) that aﬀect some key scientiﬁc dis-
ciplines simultaneously.
5. A model of knowledge based opportunity
driven entrepreneurial growth
Macro-economic models of growth have always
aimed to explain the long run upward trend in
GDP per capita by aiming for a constant long
run growth rate. As a result these models ab-
stract from the concept of economic cycles and
concentrate on the accumulative types of
knowledge generation that may support such a
constant growth rate. As was mentioned above,
instrumental knowledge accumulates smoothly.
Arrow (1962) already realized that learning by
doing could be a powerful engine of economic
growth. New growth theory now builds on that
basic principle by considering for example
learning by learning (Lucas, 1988), learning by
inventing (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Help-
man, 1991) and building on previously attained
quality levels (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). In
new growth models new knowledge is usually
created by building on what has been discovered
in the past. This is reﬂected well in the speciﬁ-
cation of the innovation function. That function
describes the (aggregate) relation between R&D
inputs, usually labor, and the number of inno-
vations produced each period. In a standard
variety expansion model such as Romer (1990)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991) that func-
tion has the general form:
_n ¼ nfðRÞ ð1Þ
where n is the stock of innovations, the range of
goods or intermediates in production. A dot over
the variable signiﬁes the time derivative and f(R)
is a function of R the amount of R&D inputs. It
is useful at this point to interpret R as applied or
entrepreneurial R&D that seeks to develop new
products or intermediates. The stock of innova-
tions then equals the range of products or
intermediates and expands at a constant rate in
steady state equilibrium (where R is constant).
If utility or ﬁnal goods production is assumed to
exhibit a love for variety, then this translates into
a constant growth rate for the economy. Note
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that n appears on the right hand side to reﬂect a
knowledge spillover from the past. Innovations
made in the past make the generation of new
innovations (proportionately) easier.
Such a set-up may capture the role of accu-
mulative instrumental knowledge but ignores
the cyclical nature of fundamental knowledge
evolution. In addition it fails to capture the
empirically well-established short and long-term
cycles in economic growth. Note also, that the
innovation function is assumed to exhibit con-
stant returns, whereas there are in fact strong
diminishing returns to re-combinatory instru-
mental knowledge generation.
A model that focuses on fundamental
knowledge evolution may well do better in these
respects. In addition it was already argued
above that fundamental knowledge becomes
ever more important in generating entrepre-
neurial opportunities. Therefore the model sug-
gested below will include a scientiﬁc community.
Its role will be to provide the raw material or
‘‘opportunities’’ for the entrepreneurial R&D in
equation (1). Assume:
_n ¼ ðnP  nÞfðRÞ ð2Þ
where nP is the stock of potential innovations or
‘‘opportunities’’ provided by scientists.22 As the
stock of innovations cannot exhaust the stock of
potential ideas, entrepreneurial R&D will run
into strong diminishing returns as the number of
realized ideas, n, approaches the number of
potential ideas, nP. On the other hand, as the
number of potential ideas expands relative to
those realized, entrepreneurial activity becomes
more eﬀective per unit of R&D labor and
therefore more attractive. For now I assume this
to be a linear relationship for simplicity. The
idea that basic science provides the raw material
for applied, entrepreneurial science is not new,
but it is, to my knowledge, new to growth the-
ory.23 ‘‘Downstream’’ the model can follow the
standard set-up of an innovation driven endog-
enous growth model as was described in for
example Grossman and Helpman (1991).
Imperfect competition implies that rents reward
successful entrepreneurs and this explains why
they can and will borrow to ﬁnance innovative
investments. It should be noted that the
entrepreneurs exhaust and fully appropriate the
rents, leaving none to motivate scientists. The
more interesting challenges therefore lie in
modeling the evolution of nP as the outcome of
the activities in the scientiﬁc community.
To do so I will ﬁrst introduce some notation.
Assume that an exogenously given number of
people, S*, engages in scientiﬁc activities. As
was argued above they are driven by an internal
motivation to solve the puzzles set by a para-
digm and an external motivation to seek priority
and peer recognition for their ideas. Output
hence comes in the form of ideas and yields
utility to the extent that curiosity is satisﬁed and
peer recognition gained. We could capture the
motivations in a utility function for scientists
and assume that they maximize it by optimally
choosing to engage in scientiﬁc activities. This
would endogenize the number of scientists but
when ideas and scientists are assumed to be
homogenous and only one type of output is al-
lowed then that maximization problem is trivial
and we will not pursue it here. Instead all sci-
entists, S* are simply assumed to engage in sci-
ence. We now need to specify how they produce
fundamental knowledge under the regime of
normal and crisis-science.
6. Normal science
Consider the value of doing normal science to
the individual scientist. Under normal science
the scientist can choose one of the puzzles set by
the paradigm. His output is then either an
anticipated solution or unanticipated anomaly.
Given the scientists strong incentive to publish,
I assume that the former adds one unit to the
existing stock of knowledge, Kt, immediately.
The latter adds to the stock of anomalies, At. To
capture this process it is convenient to assume
that all normal scientiﬁc activity generates
anomalies as an unintended side-product. This
implies that for the individual scientist:
K
:
it ¼ ðKt  KI0ÞafðSitÞ
A
:
it ¼ ðKt  KI0ÞbfðSitÞ
ð3Þ
where KI0 is the level of useful knowledge at the
adoption of the incumbent paradigm and
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function f exhibits the usual properties,
f(0) = 0, f¢(.)>0 and f¢¢ (.)<0. In addition f(.)
is normalized such that f(1) = 1. By assuming
a>0 and b>1 we ensure that, as the paradigm
ages, anomalies will accumulate faster than
knowledge for a given level of scientiﬁc activity.
Under normal science only anticipated out-
comes are valuable as anomalies are ignored by
peers. The value of being engaged in normal
science is then simply equal to the number of
anticipated solutions times the utility value of







where subscript i can be dropped when all sci-
entist are assumed to be identical. The value of
an anticipated solution in turn is equal to the
probability of obtaining priority for it, Pt, times
the value attached to peer recognition, which we
can normalize to equal 1. One might add some
constant to reﬂect the gratiﬁcation of solving the
puzzle, although I know from experience that
this gratiﬁcation is heavily eroded by the
knowledge that someone else beat you to it. For
now I therefore include it in the normalized
value of peer recognition.24
Finally it should be noted that reputations are
a lasting asset but when built under a paradigm,
they loose their value once the paradigm shifts.
As the reputation of a scientist consists of
accumulated anticipated solutions under the
paradigm we can model this by assuming that
the scientist discounts the value of solutions
under the current paradigm by the ﬂow proba-
bility that the paradigm will shift, denoted by h.
This probability is positively related to the
number of accumulated anomalies and will be







UNt essentially is the marginal utility value of
reputation that is created by the priority estab-
lishing publication of one paradigm-speciﬁc
anticipated solution at time t. Assuming the
individual scientist does not take into consider-
ation his own impact on the stock of anomalies
(i.e. he expects it to be 0 ex ante, dAt/dSit = 0)
and the probability of getting published is
exogenous to the individual scientist, reduces the
problem to a simple maximization of (4) with
respect to Sit given the ﬁrst equation in (3). The
aggregate ﬂow of anomalies then follows from
aggregating the second equation in (3) over all i.
When the paradigm is young, marginal pro-
ductivity is high and as the probability of par-
adigm switches is low, UNt is high. As the ﬂow of
anomalies increases in the level of Kt for any
constant level of S, however, it can easily be
veriﬁed that normal scientiﬁc activity will even-
tually fall as marginal productivity drops as will
UNt. This implies normal science cannot be a
steady state and occasional paradigm shifts are
required.
7. Crisis science
The steady accumulation of anomalies under
normal science will inevitably provoke a crisis in
the current paradigm. When a paradigm crisis
arises, the scientiﬁc community abandons nor-
mal science and instead alternative paradigms
are formulated, proposed and advocated. In the
search for alternative paradigms the goal is not
to solve puzzles under the incumbent paradigm.
The focus shifts towards the limitations of the
incumbent paradigm and therefore scientists
only produce anomalies. In addition the quest at
any point in time may yield theory that can serve
as an alternative paradigm. To introduce the







t ¼ ðKt  KI0ÞbfðSitÞ
PrðPAt Þ ¼ uðAtÞ
ð6Þ
where obviously we assume u¢(At)>0. Note
that because K seizes to grow the number of new
anomalies per unit of time will be constant. The
third equation captures the assumption that as
the number of anomalies increases so does the
ﬂow probability of an alternative paradigm
arising at time t. This assumption ensures the
crisis ends in ﬁnite time as long as there is
scientiﬁc activity.
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When an alternative paradigm is formulated
the aim is to get it adopted. As only one
paradigm can be adopted, alternative paradigm
formulation has the characteristics of a patent
race or tournament in which the winner takes
all. In addition the reward is enormous, both in
reputation and intrinsic rewards. But the risks
are high and the losers are usually doomed to
insigniﬁcance as they stake their scientiﬁc repu-
tation on a paradigm that is not accepted. At
this point, however, it is hard to model the
complete game among scientists and the battle
for prevalence explicitly. Rather I will assume
that the outcome of this battle of ideas is the
emergence of a new paradigm that allows the
scientiﬁc community to return to normal science
with a new initial knowledge parameter.
KA0  fKt þ nAt ð7Þ
where KA0 represents the useful knowledge
base that alternative paradigm A promises at
adoption, i.e. the number of problems it can
explain. The assumption that 0< f<1 implies
that some of the knowledge under the incum-
bent paradigm must be sacriﬁced. 0< n<1
implies an alternative cannot explain all
anomalies. To be adopted a paradigm must be
convincing to the scientiﬁc community at large.
This implies that an acceptable alternative
must at least explain some anomalies. The
reason is that the alternative paradigm cannot
be inclusive of the old paradigm by deﬁnition
(see Kuhn, 1971). If that is the case some
knowledge must be sacriﬁced when a new
paradigm is adopted and the alternative can
only be convincing if there are suﬃcient
anomalies it can explain to compensate for
that loss. Therefore there is a trade-oﬀ between
parameters f and n. Only the incumbent par-
adigm can explain all current knowledge, such
that setting f = 1 implies n = 0 by the deﬁ-
nition of an anomaly. A trade-oﬀ like:
n ¼ Stð1 fÞ
c
1þ Stð1 fÞc ð8Þ
would have the desired properties if c>1 is
assumed. Note that n can only approach 1
from below as the number of scientists goes to
inﬁnity. Out of the known problems facing
science, Kt + At, an alternative must now
explain a larger share than the incumbent
paradigm. The condition for paradigm switch-
ing is therefore:
KA0
Kt þ At >
Kt
Kt þ At ð9Þ
Now consider that every period the scientiﬁc
community is in crisis, there is a positive and
increasing probability that an alternative para-
digm is proposed. If at that point it satisﬁes (9) it
will be accepted and the crisis ends. In future
work the process may be adjusted to include
endogenization or randomization of parameters.
Still the current set-up already captures the
natural assumption that a higher share of
anomalies in the number of problems will in-
crease the attractiveness of alternative para-
digms.
The ﬂow probability of paradigm switching,
h(t) = u(At) * Pr(K
A
0 > Kt), is now equal to
the probability that a convincing alternative that
satisﬁes (9) is proposed and drawn at time t. At
the resolution of the crisis the scientiﬁc com-
munity returns to normal science but starting
from (1)n)At anomalies and a new incumbent
initial knowledge level KI0 = nAt + fKt>Kt.
Now consider the resulting dynamics.
8. The structure of scientiﬁc (R)evolutions
Figure 1 illustrates how the key variables in the
model evolve over time. The ﬁgure shows the
evolution of the key state variables Kt and At
over three cycles. Initially, under paradigm I
knowledge, K grows at a decreasing rate
whereas the number of anomalies grows at an
increasing rate according to equation (3). As
A rises, so does the probability of a crisis. When
it emerges (grey area) the accumulation of
knowledge stops while anomalies continue to
increase in a linear fashion. As anomalies
accumulate the probability of accepting a new
paradigm increases. The length of the crisis is,
however, a random variable.
At the end of the crisis paradigm II is ac-
cepted. Knowledge starts to grow from a new,
higher level of initial knowledge. To reach that
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higher initial level a number of open anomalies
must be incorporated, which causes the number
of anomalies to fall. Once more the number of
anomalies starts to grow at increasing and the
knowledge stock starts to expand at a decreasing
rate, until a new crisis emerges.
9. From knowledge to opportunity to innovation
to cyclical growth
Now the crucial point in this paper is to see that
entrepreneurship can use the knowledge, Kt,
accumulated in science as their raw material for
thinking up new products and services. Vision
and entrepreneurial talent are required to for-
mulate commercially viable ideas for products
and services from this stock of fundamental
knowledge. In that sense Kt can be considered
an input, together with entrepreneurial vision
and eﬀort, in the generation of potential new
products nP.25 As was argued above scientists
are not primarily interested in or particularly
talented for this activity.
nP then constitutes the universe of opportu-
nities for entrepreneurial R&D. It is the entre-
preneurs that seize such opportunities and bring
them to the realm of commercial enterprise by
organizing ﬁnancial, legal and knowledge re-
sources inside or outside existing ﬁrms. It is
they, who are motivated by expected proﬁt
ﬂows. New growth theory thus attributes to
them the role of generating public fundamental
knowledge underlying their product as an
externality to their quest for rents. By distin-
guishing the role of science from the entrepre-
neur we gain an important insight. We cannot
rely on such externalities to emerge automati-
cally.
As it is likely that entrepreneurial activity is
easier and more rewarding when there is a large
fundamental knowledge base, this model
predicts, given the dynamics of scientiﬁc evolu-
tion, that in a paradigmatic crisis entrepreneur-
ial activity stalls. The entrepreneurs are less
successful in generating and realizing new ideas
and therefore more likely to engage in other
activities. Commercial R&D activity would
reallocate towards productivity enhancement in
incumbent ﬁrms.
Similarly a breakthrough in science causes a
jump in K followed by relatively steep increases
in the early stages of paradigm exploration. This
boom in fundamental knowledge will, ceteris
paribus, increase the number of opportunities
and therefore attract more entrepreneurial
activity, reallocating commercial R&D towards
new product development. These cycles in
knowledge evolution that cause cycles in entre-
preneurial activity are therefore likely to trans-
late into cycles in economic growth, cycles in
R&D activity and ultimately even in cycles in
the labor market at large.26
10. Concluding remarks
The model presented in this paper seeks to un-
cover the interplay between scientiﬁc knowledge
creation, entrepreneurial knowledge commer-
cialization and innovation driven economic
growth. It brings together insights from endog-
enous growth theory, entrepreneurship research
and the philosophy of science to build a model










Figure 1. The evolution of the state variables over time.
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modern growth theory) that innovation, the
commercialization of new knowledge, creates
growth. Then (with entrepreneurship research)
that entrepreneurs commercialize the opportu-
nities that new knowledge creation presents,
taking away the rents and proﬁts as their re-
ward. And ﬁnally (with the philosophy and
economics of science) that knowledge creation
follows a reputation driven, cyclical paradigm
shifting dynamic process as described ﬁrst by
Kuhn (1971). The model generated opportunity
driven cycles in entrepreneurial activity, waves
of innovation and consequently transmits cycles
in knowledge creation to economic growth. If
one accepts the assumptions made, the impli-
cations of these ﬁndings could be profound.
First the realization that economic growth is
a process that can be frustrated at every stage
has some interesting policy implications. Seen in
this light, the European Paradox of having
plenty of good science but no growth to show
for it, is not a paradox but simply a lack of
entrepreneurial activity. Similarly the success of
the US can be attributed to a well-balanced
system of high quality scientiﬁc research and a
vibrant entrepreneurial culture, and one won-
ders if the current trend towards mixing these
functions is a good idea. The model also has
implications for less developed and developing
countries. Growth may start by helping local
entrepreneurs to recognize and exploit the
opportunities in slightly more developed econ-
omies. But then high growth in China and India
can thus be predicted to stall once the oppor-
tunity frontier, freely available in the advanced
economies, is reached. Additionally until that
time they would be crazy indeed to respect
intellectual property rights. The recipe for sus-
tainable long run growth is to build a scientiﬁc
community that can tap into but also contrib-
utes to the global fundamental knowledge pool
and to make sure the opportunities that emerge
continue to be implemented.
The paper could also shed light on some long
standing issues in the academic literature. The
touched upon importance of scientiﬁc institu-
tions combined with the establishment of the ﬁrst
universities in Europe in the late 15th century
may help explain the fundamental question in
economic history: ‘‘Why Europe, why in the 17th
century?’’. Connecting Kuhns historical ap-
proach to science and mainstream endogenous
growth models could also to begin to bridge the
gap between evolutionary and rational choice
based theories of economic growth. This paper
does not address these issues in great detail, but
taking an integrated approach to growth creates
ample opportunities for an entrepreneurial scien-
tist to pursue in the future.
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Notes
1 Kuznets (1971) in his Nobel speech for example men-
tions it. Landes (1969) also linked scientiﬁc discovery to
economic growth as did and do many.
2 See Audretsch and Thurik (2001c) and Karlsson et al.
(2004) for overviews of the literature that make this point
compellingly. Recent references listed there include among
others Acs (1996, 1999), Acs and Audretsch (2001), Au-
dretsch and Thurik (1997, 2001a, 2001b), Audretsch et al.
(2002), Carree and Thurik (1998), Carree et al. (1999,
2002), Thurik (1996), Verheul et al. (2003), who frequently
go all the way back to early writers as Schumpeter (1934)
and Knight (1921).
3 Although it is hard to get any group of entrepreneur-
ship researchers to agree on a deﬁnition of their ﬁeld, this
deﬁnition as well as many others contains the key concept
of a commercial opportunity that either exists objectively or
is perceived subjectively by the entrepreneur and is the
prerequisite for the entrepreneur to act.
4 This argument has been made much more elaborately
in Acs et al. (2004).
5 This explanation in terms of the production possibilities
curve is due to Landstro¨m (1999).
6 He´bert and Link (1989) provide an extensive survey of
the ﬁeld.
7 Lucas (1988) should also be mentioned as one of the
founding fathers of endogenous growth theory. His model,
however, relies on the accumulation of productive skills in
the labour force rather than explicitly model innovation in
products and services. As there is no role for the entrepre-
neur in that class of models it is less interesting to the
purpose of this paper.
8 One should not confuse these terms with Lyotards
(1979) terminology, where ‘‘instrumental knowledge’’ is in
fact scientiﬁc and opposed to ‘‘narrative knowledge’’. My
terminology is closer to the use in cognitive psychology (e.g.
Dickinson and Shanks, 1995), where ‘‘instrumental
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knowledge’’ is the knowledge of cause and eﬀect relations. I
closely follow the distinction proposed by Jantsch (1967)
between intrinsic and instrumental knowledge and the
OECDs general understanding of the terms.
9 Commercial R&D emerged in the early 20th century as
scientiﬁc methods of systematically looking for fundamen-
tal knowledge were applied in the quest for commercial
applications as well.
10 Much like learning-by-doing generates fundamental
understanding by accident. But the assumption that science
aims for fundamental knowledge should not be read as a
claim that real life scientists do not care for commercial
applications. Some or even many scientists may try to turn
their own fundamental knowledge into opportunities and
products by starting up a business, however, in my deﬁni-
tions they then seize to be pure scientists as they become
entrepreneurs and later on producers.
11 Brandstetter and Ogura (2005) for example document
an explosion in patents citing academic science since the
mid 80s. The fact that scientists and universities are engaged
in the commercialization of their knowledge could also
explain the increasing occurrence of scientiﬁc citations in
patents. In fact the 1980 Baht-Dole Act was intended and
has been successful in stimulating such commercialization
eﬀorts in the US and many such initiatives have been
launched around the world. The model I present here makes
a strict separation in functions, but does intend to claim
that people or institutions are limited to just one of both
activities. Empirically the boundaries between the pure
scientiﬁc pursuit of knowledge and the commercial R&D
process can hardly be drawn and have been blurred
throughout history. James Watt was an engineer in the
service of mining corporations. And Boyls scientiﬁc work
on the properties of gases undeniably helped improve the
original design of the steam engine as much as the many
engineering problems that arose have inspired new scientiﬁc
discoveries and commercial opportunities. This mixing of
functions does not, however, imply that a model that is
built on ‘‘pure’’ types has no merit.
12 For learning-by-doing this is obvious as one learns
from observing already applied ideas. In Romerian inno-
vation driven growth models the assumption is that new
innovations are somehow easier to create when more
innovations have been made in the past. This intertemporal
knowledge spillover clearly intends to capture the produc-
tivity of old ideas in creating new ones.
13 Economic growth, measured as the expansion of GDP,
is well known to miss in particular the contribution of
radically new goods and services in the early stages of their
life cycle. The famous quote from Solow that: ‘‘computers
are everywhere but in the productivity statistics’’, spawned
a literature on the productivity paradox that also explores
these measurement problems. By today computers undeni-
ably show up in GDP and their massive impact is picked up
in productivity statistics. Re-combination of ICT knowl-
edge with existing knowledge on logistics, information
management, engineering, etc. etc. etc. make this technol-
ogy be felt much more than the original introduction of
personal computers no-one knew how to put to good use.
14 Jaﬀe (1989) and Branstetter and Ogura (2005) point out
that scientiﬁc knowledge plays an increasing role in patents,
particularly in emerging General Purpose Technologies
such as biotech and ICT.
15 The earlier mentioned papers by Olsson (2000, 2005)
are two of the rare instances to my knowledge, where
knowledge creation is probed at the micro-level to inform
growth theory. In another paper, Olsson and Frey (2002)
the entrepreneur is explicitly given the role of recombining
existing ideas into new commercial products. Olsson stres-
ses the importance of occasional Kuhnian paradigm shifts
for long run growth in all these papers and also predicts
technology driven long Kondratieﬀ cycles in growth. In his
models, however, he does not explicitly consider the insti-
tutional peculiarities in basic science that generate such
dynamics nor does he recognize the function of anomalies
in endogenously provoking a paradigm shifts (see below).
In addition his elegant conceptualization of knowledge in a
multidimensional idea space adds more complexity that I
require to make the point of this paper.
16 In this paper I consider the overview articles by Stephan
(1996) and Dasgupta and David (1994) as representative for
the mainstream in this ﬁeld and used Diamond (2006) for
more recent references.
17 The philosophy of science has moved from the simple
linear accumulation view to Poppers (1968) falsiﬁcation
theory that Lakatos (1971) and Kuhn (1971) sought to
improve. Lakatos and Kuhns historical approaches were
then reﬁned into the more social-constructivist (Bijker,
1995) and actor-network (Latour, 1987) theories. These
modern theories, however, bring in a lot of complexity that
I would have to abstract from in the model to keep it
manageable.
18 Stigler and Becker (1977) for example argued all hu-
mans have the same utility function and scientist are no
diﬀerent than humans in that respect.
19 Diamond (1986) for example estimated the monetary
value of a citation in annual additional earnings between 50
and 1,300 dollars. Cole and Cole (1967, 1973), Gaston
(1970) and Cole (1978) also provide evidence that scientiﬁc
reward systems are fundamentally diﬀerent and succeed in
aligning individual incentives with the Mertonian (1969)
ideal of a universalistic scientiﬁc community that would
discover and disclose knowledge quickly.
20 See Stephan (1996).
21 I thank an anonymous referee for making this point.
22 To be precise, the scientists do not develop oﬀ the
shelve opportunities but rather develop knowledge that
visionary entrepreneurs can use to formulate product ideas.
One might therefore wish to put some opportunity/idea
production function between nP, the opportunities and raw
knowledge, the output of scientiﬁc activities, K. Entrepre-
neurial talent and eﬀort may then be considered inputs in
this production function as well, e.g. nP = f(K, E,...). As
long as this function is homogenous of degree 1 with respect
to K, the stock of knowledge, this will not change the re-
sults.
23 A nice quote by Charles Stine, advocating basic re-
search in a presentation to DuPonts Executives in 1926,
351Theory of Economic Growth
shows that managers have realized the importance of sci-
ence for growth early in the last century. He was quoted in
Stephan (1996) to have said: ‘‘applied research is facing a
shortage of its raw materials’’, p. 1209. Perhaps an instance
of instrumental knowledge in economics.
24 Note that, for simplicity, I assume that all anticipated
solutions add similarly to reputation. Of course in reality
puzzles under the paradigm diﬀer greatly in status.
25 See Keilbach and Sanders (2006).
26 See for example Sanders (2005) and Acemoglu (2006)
on models that relate technical change to labor market
implications for low and high skilled.
References
Acemoglu, D., 2006, ‘Equilibrium Bias of Technology, NBER
Working Papers, No. 11845, NBER, Cambridge MA.
Acs, Z., 1996, Small Firms in Economic Growth, in Z. B. Acs
Carlsson and R. Thurik (ed). Small Business in the Modern
Economy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers1–62.
Acs, Z., 1999, The New American Evolution, in Z. Acs (ed). Are
Small Firms Important? Their Role and Impact, Dortrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers1–20.
Acs, Z. and D. Audretsch, 2001, The Emergence of the Entre-
preneurial Society, Stockholm: Swedisch Foundation for
Small Business Research.
Acs, Z., D. Audretsch, P. Braunerhjelm and B. Carlsson, 2004,
‘The Missing Link: the Knowledge Filter and Entrepre-
neurship in Economic Growth, CEPR-discussion papers,
No. 4783 Stockholm, www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4783.asp.
Acs, Z., D. Audretsch, P. Braunerhjelm and B. Carlsson, 2006,
‘Growth and Entrepreneurship: an Empirical Assesment,
CEPR-discussion papers, No. 5409 Stockholm, www.ce-
pr.org/pubs/dps/DP5409.asp.
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt, 1992, A Model of Growth through
Creative Destruction, Econometrica 60, 323–351.
Aghion, P. and P. Howitt, 1998, Endogenous Growth Theory,
Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Arrow, K., 1962, The Economic Implications of Learning by
Doing, Review of Economic Studies 29, 155–173.
Audretsch, D. and M. Keilbach, 2005, ‘Entrepreneurship,
Growth and Restructuring, Max Planck Institute of Eco-
nomics Discussion Paper Series, No. 1306, Max Planck
Institute, Jena.
Audretsch, D. and R. Thurik, 1997, ‘Sources of Growth: The
Entrepreneurial vs the Managed Economy, in: Tinbergen
Institute Discussion Papers, No. 97–109/3, Tinbergen Insti-
tute, Amsterdam.
Audretsch, D. and R. Thurik, 2001a, What is New about the
New Economy: Sources of Growth in the Managed and
Entrepreneurial Economy, Industrial and Corporate Change
10, 267–315.
Audretsch, D. and R. Thurik, 2001b, Capitalism and Democ-
racy in the 21st Century: from the Managed to the Entre-
preneurial Economy, in D U. Mueller Cantner (ed).
Capitalism and Democracy in the 21st Century, Heidelberg:
Physica-Verlag.
Audretsch, D. and R. Thurik, 2001c, ‘Linking Entrepreneur-
ship to Growth’, OECD STI Working Paper Series, 2001/2,
Paris.
Audretsch, D. and R. Thurik, 2002, ‘Linking Entrepreneurship
to Growth, OECD STI Working Papers, OECD, Paris.
Audretsch, D. and M. A. R. Carree Stel Thurik, 2002, Impeded
Industrial Restructuring: The Growth Penalty, Kyklos 55,
81–97.
Barro, R. and X. Sala-I-Martin, 2004, Economic Growth, 2nd
ed, Cambridge MA: MIT-Press.
Bijker, W., 1995, Of Bicycles, Bakelites and Bulbs; Towards a
Theory of Sociotechnical Change, Cambridge MA: MIT
Press.
Brandstetter, L. and Y. Ogura, 2005, ‘Is Academic research
driving a Surge in Industrial Innovation? Evidence form
Patent Citations, NBER Working Papers, No. 11561,
NBER, Cambridge Massachussets.
Bresnahan, T. and M. Trajtenberg, 1995, General Purpose
technologies- Engines of Growth?, Journal of Econometrics
65, 83–108.
Cantillion, R., 1755, ‘The Circulation And Exchange Of Good
And Merchandise, in M. Casson (ed.), (1990) Entrepre-
neurship, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers, 5–10.
Carree, M. and R. Thurik, 1998, Small Firms and Economic
Growth in Europe, Atlantic Economic Journal 26, 137–146.
Carree, M., A. van Stel, R. Thurik and S. Wennekers, 1999,
‘Business Ownership and economic Growth: An Empirical
Investigation, EIM Research Report, No. 9809, EIM,
Zoetermeer.
Carree, M. and A. R. S. Stel Thurik Wennekers, 2002, Eco-
nomic Development and Business Ownership: An Analysis
using Data of 23 OECD Countries in the Period 1976–1996,
Small Business Economics 19, 271–290.
Cole, S. and J. R. Cole, 1967, ‘Scientiﬁc Output and Recogni-
tion: A Study in the Operation of the Reward System in
Science’, American Sociological Review, 32, 377–390.
Cole, J. R. and S. Cole, (1973), Social Stratiﬁcation in Science,
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Cole, S., 1978, ‘Scientiﬁc Reward Systems: A Comparative
Analysis’, Research in Sociology of Knowledge, Sciences and
Art, 1, 167–190.
Dasgupta, P. and P. David, 1994, Towards an New Economics
of Science, Research Policy 23, 487–521.
Diamond, A., 1986, What is a Citation Worth?, The Journal of
Human Resources 21, 200–215.
Diamond, A., 2006, Economics of Science, in S. Durlauf and L.
Blume (ed). The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd
Ed, London: Pagrave Publishers.
Dickinson, A. and D. Shanks, 1995, Instrumental Action and
Causal Representation, in D. Sperber, D. Premack and A.
Premack (ed). Causal Cognition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dosi, G., 1982, Technological Paradigms and Technological
Trajectories: A Suggested Interpretation of the Determi-
nants and Directions of Technical Change, Research Policy
11, 147–162.
EU, 2003, Green Paper on Entrepreneurship in Europe, Com-




EU, 2004, Action Plan; The European Agenda for Entrepre-
neurship, Commission of the European Communities,
Brussels, downloadable at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
entrepreneurship/promoting_entrepreneurship/doc/co-
m_70_en.pdf.
Gaston, J., 1970, ‘The Reward System in British Science’,
American Sociological Review, 35, 718–730.
Griliches, Z., 1979, Issues in Assessing the Contribution of
Research and development to Productivity Growth, Bell
Journal of Economics 10, 92–116.
Griliches, Z., 1984, R&D and Innovation: Some Empirical
Findings; Comments, in Z. Griliches (ed). R&D, Patents and
Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Griliches, Z., 1992, The Search for R&D Spillovers, Scandi-
navian Journal of Economics 94, S29–47.
Grossman, G. and E. Helpman, 1991, Innovation and Growth in
the Global Economy, Cambridge,Massachusetts: MIT Press.
He´bert, R. and A. Link, 1989, In Search of the Meaning of
Entrepreneurship, Small Business Economics 1, 39–49.
Jaﬀe, A., 1986, Technological Opportunity and Spillover of
R&D: Evidence from FirmsPatents, Proﬁts and Market
Value, American Economic Review 76, 984–1001.
Jaﬀe, A., 1989, Real Eﬀects of Academic Research, American
Economic Review 79, 957–970.
Jaﬀe, A. and M. Trajtenberg, 2002, Patents, Citations and
Innovations; A Window on the Knowledge Economy, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Jantsch, E., 1967, Technological Forecasting in Perspective,
Paris: OECD.
Jones, C., 2006, Growth and Ideas, in: P. Aghion (Ed.),
Handbook of Economic Growth, Forthcoming Elsevier
Publishers.
Karlsson, C., C. Friis and T. Paulsson, 2004, ‘Relating Entre-
preneurship to Economic Growth, CESIS Electronic
Working Paper Series, No. 13.
Keilbach, M. and M. Sanders, 2006, ‘Entrepreneurship in a
Model of Economic Growth, Max Planck Institute of
Economics Working Paper Series, forthcoming.
Kirzner, I., 1973, Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Knight, F., 1921, Risk, Uncertainty and Proﬁt, New York:
Houghton Miﬄin.
Krugman, P., 1979, A Model of Innovation, Technology
Transfer and the World Distribution of Income, Journal of
Political Economy 87, 253–266.
Kuhn, T., 1971, The Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions, 3rd Ed.
1996, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Kuznets, S., 1971, Modern Economic Growth: Findings and
Reﬂections, Lecture to the memory of Alfred Nobel, delivered
December 11th 1971, Stockholm, Sweden, downloaded
from http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/1971/kuz-
nets-lecture.htm.
Lakatos, I., 1971, History of Science and Its Rational recon-
struction, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8, 91–
136.
Latour, B., 1987, Science in Action, translated in Dutch by de
Lange and Maters [1988],Wetenschap in Actie, Amsterdam:
Bert Bakker Uitgeverij.
Landes, D., 1969, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological
Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from
1750 to the Present, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Lanstro¨m, H., 1999, ‘Entrepreno¨rskapets Ro¨tter, Studentlit-
teratur, Lund.
Lucas, R., 1988, On the Mechanics of Economic Develop-
ment, Journal of Monetary Economics 22, 3–42.
Lyotard, J., 1979, The Post-Modern Condition, Manchester
University Press.
Merton, R., 1957, Priorities in Scientiﬁc Discovery: A Chapter
in the Sociology of Science, American Sociological Review
22, 653–659.
Merton, R., 1968, The Matthew Eﬀect in Science, Science 159,
56–63.
Merton, R., 1969, Behavior Patterns of Scientists, American
Scientist 57, 1–23.
Nelson, R. and S. Winter, 1977, In Search of a Useful Theory
of Innovation, Research Policy 6, 35–76.
Olsson, O., 2000, Knowledge as a Set in Idea Space: An
Epistemological View on Growth, Journal of Economic
Growth 5, 253–275.
Olsson, O., 2005, Technological Opportunity and Growth,
Journal of Economic Growth 10, 35–57.
Olsson, O. and B. Frey, 2002, Entrepreneurship as Re-
combinant Growth, Small Business Economics 19, 69–80.
Popper, K., 1968, The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery, London:
Hutchinson Publishers.
Romer, P., 1990, Endogenous Technical Change, Journal of
Political Economy 98, S71–S102.
Sanders, M., 2005, Technology and the Decline of Unskilled
Labour Demand: A Theoretical Analysis of the US and
European Labour Markets, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Schumpeter, J., 1934, ‘The Theory of Economic Development,
in: M. Casson (ed.) (1990) Entrepreneurship, Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishers, 105–134.
Segerstrom, P. and T. E. Anant Dinopoulos, 1990, A
Schumpeterian Model of the Product Life Cycle, The
American Economic Review 80, 1077–1091.
Shane, S. and S. Venkataraman, 2000, The Promise of Entre-
preneurship as a Field of Research, Academy of Manage-
ment Review 25, 217–221.
Solow, R., 1957, Technical Change and the Aggregate Pro-
duction Function, Review of Economics and Statistics 39,
312–320.
Stephan, P., 1996, The Economics of Science, Journal of
Economic Literature 34, 1199–1235.
Sterman, J., 1982, The Growth of Knowledge: Testing a Theory
of Scientiﬁc Revolutions with a Formal Model, in MIT
Working Paper, No. 1326–82, available online at: https://
hpds1.mit.edu/retrieve/1636/SWP-1326–09065900.pdf .
Sterman, J. and J. Wittenberg, 1999, ‘Path Dependence, Com-
petition and Succession in the Dynamics of Scientiﬁc Rev-
olution, Organization Science 10, 322–341.
Stigler, G. J. and G. S. Becker, 1977, ‘De Gustibus Non Est
Disputandum’, American Economic Review, 67, 76–90.
Thurik, R., 1996, Small Firms, Entrepreneurship and Economic
Growth, in Z. B. Acs Carlsson and R. Thurik (ed). Small
353Theory of Economic Growth
Business in the Modern Economy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell
126–152.
Verheul, I and S. D. R. Wennekers Audretsch Thurik, 2003, An
Eclectic Theory of Entrepreneurship, in D. Audretsch (ed).
The Globalisation of the World Economy, Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar Publishers.
Wennekers, S. and R. Thurik, 1999, ‘Linking Entrepreneurship
and Economic Growth, Small Business Economics 13, 27–55.
354 Mark Sanders
